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I. Introduction
The results of Turkey’s development and diplomatic efforts in Somalia 
are striking. Turkey has only been involved in Somalia since 2011, yet 
it can point to a string of successes, physical edifices, and an arguably 
outsized presence in the country. Turkey’s overall efforts in Somalia 
and its projection of “soft power” in the forms of money, trade, in-kind 
donations, infrastructure rehabilitation, and development projects 
have met a positive reception inside and outside Somalia. This begs 
the question of why Turkey chose to involve itself in a country that is 
so often characterized as violent and chaotic; a location in which Tur-
key possesses neither geopolitical and security concerns nor common 
borders. The few sources documenting Turkey’s actions have largely 
offered arguments that cited a shared history and a common Sunni 
Muslim religion and culture.1 As such, the deconstruction of Turkey’s 
impetuses and motivations behind its decision to involve itself in 
Somalia is overdue. Also lacking is an exploration of the reactions and 
actions of Somalis, particularly those in positions of power, and their 
utilization and even exploitation of Turkey and its efforts in Somalia.
II. Contextualization: Political Prestige and Capital
Turkey is involved in Somalia for two main reasons: political capital in 
the form of international prestige, and capital. These conclusions are 
based on the examination of a variety of sources. They indicate that 
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Turkey’s decision to involve itself in Somalia was made at the high-
est level of government and is part of a wider strategy of enhancing 
Turkey’s global image and soft power.2 Once made, this decision was 
coordinated closely with Turkish businesses, NGOs, and governmen-
tal ministries. In short, Turkey chose Somalia as a stage on which to 
burnish its foreign policy credentials and obtain the soft power sta-
tus felt by the leadership in Ankara that adequately reflects Turkey’s 
emerging power status.
This involvement came about not because of Turkey’s and Somalia’s 
common Sunni Muslim heritage, or its Muslim Brotherhood ties, or 
because of some greater appeal to charity and development—though 
these clearly were motivating factors. Rather, Turkey’s main aim in 
engaging Somalia is the political and diplomatic capital it receives out-
side of Somalia and the region. This comes in the form of commenda-
tions and applause for Turkey’s diplomatic and humanitarian efforts 
in a volatile corner of the world. It issues from major powers like the 
United States and the United Kingdom, as well as Arab states, and 
includes international organizations such as the United Nations.
Given the natural impetus and desire for international recognition 
and clout among nation-states, this article argues that the government 
of the then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chose Soma-
lia as a launching pad for Turkey’s desired role as a player on the 
international stage rather than its traditional role as a regional actor 
with ambitions that have historically been limited and, more recently, 
severely frustrated. Turkey’s relationship with its near abroad and its 
policy of “zero problems with its neighbors” are in shambles. Indeed, 
Turkey presently seems to be facing “zero neighbors without prob-
lems.”3 Its influence has waned from Egypt to Central Asia for a vari-
ety of reasons and forces that Turkey cannot or will not control.4
Turkey can point to one bright spot in its foreign policy: Soma-
lia. It represents a cornerstone of Turkey’s emerging power foreign 
policy, a policy whereby it attempts “to present itself as an essential 
power beyond its immediate neighborhood.”5 In Somalia, at present, 
it has been largely successful in this endeavor. Turkey found fertile 
ground in Somalia for its combination of government-coordinated 
funding, business ventures, and humanitarian work accompanied by 
lots of money. Somalia presented an opportunity for Turkey—a very 
risky opportunity that appears to have been worth the risk. This for-
eign policy and diplomatic success was possible because by the time 
Erdoğan and his coterie decided to engage Somalia in 2011, many of 
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the barriers to success had arguably been lowered. Repeatedly, Soma-
lia had proved to be the graveyard of countless diplomatic, political, 
and humanitarian gambits. Therefore, Turkey’s willingness and abil-
ity to take significantly bold risks in Somalia meant a greater return 
on its investment. This has had the direct result of burnishing Tur-
key’s image on the international stage and especially in Africa, and 
transforming Turkey into a humanitarian and diplomatic power in a 
region traditionally outside its sphere of influence.6 In turn, the risks 
taken by Turkey in Somalia have translated into the form of greater 
potential Somali dependence on Turkish goods, expertise, and ser-
vices. Somalia has become a major destination for Turkish goods and 
services, to include construction material, medical equipment, educa-
tion development and schools, engineering expertise, and household 
items that range from teapots to clothing. And the Turkish presence 
is ubiquitous. According to one Somali resident, “Turkey has become 
the McDonald’s of Mogadishu. Their flags are everywhere, just like the 
yellow arches of McDonald’s are everywhere in America.”7
Turkey’s efforts in Somalia are viewed by some as honest and 
humanitarian in nature. This is a far cry from the explicit or implicit 
political gestures of other players in Somalia, including the U.K., the 
U.S., the African Union (AU), and the UN.8 Yet, Turkey is not viewed 
so charitably across Somalia. On the contrary, it has been criticized for 
focusing exclusively on Mogadishu and, to a lesser extent, regional 
capitals in Somaliland and Puntland. Indeed, some who feel excluded 
voice negative sentiments about Turkey.9
III. Turkish Foreign Policy in Africa and Somalia: 
A Literature Review
The literature on Turkey’s foreign policy and recent activism under the 
leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is instructive 
in three ways vis-à-vis Turkey’s engagement with Somalia. First, it 
demonstrates that Turkey’s foreign policy for the first 75 years of its 
existence was largely focused on its membership in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and influenced by the dynamics of the 
Cold War. Second, the literature indicates that Turkey began to shift 
its foreign policy focus from countries to its west to those to its east 
(Central Asia and the Middle East) after the end of the Cold War and 
prior to the election of Erdoğan and the AKP in 2002.10 In particular, 
Idris Bal’s edited work presents an excellent balance between theory, 
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diplomatic history, emerging power diplomacy, and analyses. Its main 
area of focus is the post-World War II era but it also makes reference to 
the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s and, importantly, research from 
the Ottoman past and the first years of the Turkish Republic.11
The literature demonstrates just how muscular and coordinated 
Turkey’s foreign policy has been toward Africa under the leadership 
of Erdoğan and how it ignored the continent prior to his election. 
However, as Nicholas Danforth demonstrates, the AKP’s engagement 
with Africa and, in particular, the Middle East, has historical prece-
dents rooted in a pragmatism that often eludes scholars who inter-
pret Turkish foreign policy through the lens of an ideological debate 
between the country’s Eastern and Western identities. He asserts that, 
“In formulating their approaches toward Europe and the Middle East, 
Turkish leaders have seldom been influenced by the ideologies that 
determine their domestic politics. Understood in context, [the founder 
of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal] Atatürk’s disengagement from the 
Middle East and the AKP’s re-engagement with the region were both 
practical responses to strategic realities.”12
Turkey’s engagement in Somalia may be viewed from the vantage 
point of emerging power diplomacy. Diplomacy and recognition 
play central roles in the conventional conferral of state legitimacy and 
functioning of the inter-state system. They focus on sovereignty and 
legitimacy; the diplomatic relationships fostered and institutions of 
diplomacy constructed; and the strategic position of such diplomacy 
vis-à-vis the conventional state-system.13 Andrew Cooper and Dennis 
Flemes focus on specific riddles about the foreign policy strategies 
of emerging powers like Turkey. While they focus heavily on Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS), they attempt to 
also provide answers to whether the preference of emerging powers is 
to utilize established institutions or to use parallel and/or competitive 
mechanisms. The authors also look at the balance between material 
interests, status-enhancement, and identity issues as motivators for 
policy preferences.14
Some scholars have attempted to go beyond the state-centrism of 
existing approaches through the examination of how challenges to 
global governance by emerging powers are rooted in specific state-so-
ciety configurations.15 Studies of Brazil, India, and China, as well as 
Turkey and other regional powers, examine the way domestic arrange-
ments, constructs, actors, and undercurrents influence the nature of the 
international interventions and behavior of emerging states. Attempts 
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are made to answer how emerging powers such as Turkey’s increased 
political and economic involvement in the international system define 
their own internal societal cohesion and development. In the case of 
Turkey there are:
the self-reinforcing dynamics between Turkey’s domestic political-eco-
nomic transformation in the first decade of this century and the advan-
tageous regional developments in the Middle East at the same time. It 
holds that this specific linkage—the ‘Ankara Moment’—and its regional 
resonance in the neighboring Middle East carries more transformative 
potential than the ‘Washington Consensus’ or the ‘Beijing Consensus’ so 
prominently discussed in current global South politics.16
Over the past decade, Mehmet Özkan has highlighted that Turkey’s 
approach to Africa differs from many other countries.17 Specifically, he 
points to the fact that Turkey is a mid-sized country with a developing 
economy whose interest is trade rather than extraction of resources 
such as oil. Importantly, Turkey also generally eschews something 
many Africans resent: free market capitalist baggage aimed at securing 
the best agreement, regardless of cost.18
A detailed study of Turkey’s developing relationship with Africa 
for the fifteen years stretching from 1998 to 2013 highlights multiple 
important steps taken by Turkey and various African countries and 
organizations, such as the AU, to reach the current state of affairs.19 
In particular, following the implementation of Turkey’s 1998 Action 
Plan for the Opening Policy towards Africa, Turkey participated in 
AU summits as a guest country after 2002 and obtained “observer 
status” in the AU in 2005. This status provides Turkey with permanent 
institutional contacts in Africa, and vice versa. The permanent contact 
assured through this observer status may also assist in changing per-
ceptions in both Turkey and Africa. The importance—symbolically and 
politically—of the first and second Africa-Turkey summits as well as 
the formation of the Africa Strategic Coordination Committee should 
not be ignored. The Committee was formed in 2010 and the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned as the coordinating institu-
tion, arguably lending weight and credence to its mission.20
Soon after Turkey’s much-publicized foray into Somalia and the 
personal visit by Erdoğan and his family to Mogadishu, two mecha-
nisms available to Turkish elites and policymakers were explored by 
scholars: first, membership in international organizations and, second, 
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rewriting Turkey’s cultural landscape.21 Turkey’s role in the Organi-
zation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and its strategic partnership with 
the AU are particular areas of focus. Importantly, Turkey’s relation-
ship with various African states, to include Somalia, appears to be 
dominated by the quest for material gains. It is also, “flexible and 
pragmatic enough to capture the opportunities when they arise. In 
accomplishing its gains, Turkey resorts to international leadership role 
in the region by stressing existing commonality of goals (interests) and 
norms between African states and itself, conducive for cooperation.”22
The research in this analysis fully supports these findings, demon-
strating that Turkey’s interest in Somalia is driven not by Turkey’s and 
Somalia’s common Sunni Muslim heritage, or its Muslim Brotherhood 
ties, or because of some greater appeal to charity and development. 
Rather, Turkey’s main aim in engaging Somalia is to gain political 
and diplomatic capital outside of Somalia as well as the locating of 
another market for Turkish goods. In short, Turkish diplomatic prag-
matism has resulted in international praise for Turkey’s work but it 
has also resulted in Turkish businesses, many with strong ties to the 
ruling AKP, making lots of money. Termed “Turkish exceptionalism” 
by one scholar, this exceptionalism can be defined as, “the coupling 
of political altruism, embedded in Prime Minister Erdoğan’s personal 
international agenda, with Turkish ‘soft power’ in the Muslim world to 
assist failed states.”23 Such policies simultaneously advance Turkey’s 
national economic interests and the objectives that further its interna-
tional power and prestige. Importantly, “while Turkey’s intention to 
be a responsible power in Somalia is genuine, the wider geo-politics of 
Turkey advancing its raison d’etat is coupled within this paradigm [of 
Turkish exceptionalism]. As Turkey’s latent power grows, it will seek 
out similar opportunities to use its soft power via international autism 
to achieve its wide-ranging national interests of becoming a regional 
and global power.”24
In regard to the study of emerging powers and the quest for interna-
tional prestige and status, Oliver Stuenkel argues that the 2009 BRICS 
summit was successful because it institutionalized a nascent organiza-
tion in the eyes of other international actors. At the same time, belong-
ing to the new club helped member states raise their international 
profile and status, which is useful for achieving joint or individual 
national goals.25 Stuenkel and other scholars take the quest for interna-
tional prestige as a given. Indeed, much has been written on the com-
petition for international sporting events, such as the World Cup and 
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Olympics, which confer on host countries the twin benefits of prestige 
and profits.26
In Turkey’s case, its interests and discourse under AKP leader-
ship reveal both a much more ambitious foreign policy agenda that, 
on the one hand, attempts to place Turkey in a favorable position to 
shape the contemporary international order and, on the other, allows 
it to expand its economic and commercial networks at the global level. 
Based on statements made by then Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu in 2010, Turkey aims to be a key figure in the resolution of 
regional conflicts and to further promote regional security and eco-
nomic integration. In addition, the AKP wishes to cement Turkey’s 
economic and diplomatic presence at the global level. In this respect, 
the Middle East and Africa play a particularly crucial role, especially 
given recent developments with the European Union (EU) that make 
Turkey’s membership less palatable to Turks.27
IV. Why Turkey Chose Somalia
Evidence strongly suggests that Erdoğan and his close government 
ministers, particularly Davutoğlu, chose Somalia, despite the signif-
icant risks, because of the potential payout in terms of international 
recognition, increased diplomatic profile, and profit.28 From a political 
economy perspective, while investments in hot spots such as Somalia 
are risky, the rewards can be great. The rules of the game in politics 
and business either do not exist as they would in more stable states or 
when they exist in an unstable environment are often ignored or fungi-
ble. As will be demonstrated, this is precisely the situation that Turkey 
has been able to exploit so well.
But why did Turkey choose to become involved in Somalia rather 
than another state, either in its near abroad or in Africa? It seems that 
Turkey avoided countries that were economically and politically sta-
ble, at least when compared with Somalia. For example, Turkey could 
have chosen to work in Ethiopia or South Sudan. Closer to Mogadishu, 
it could have expanded its presence and clout in Somaliland, a de-facto 
and self-declared independent region of Somalia that has experienced 
internal stability for much of the past two decades. However, this 
article argues that it is precisely this type of political and economic 
stability that led Turkey to eschew engagement with a country like 
Somaliland. Instead, Turkey’s leaders chose to involve the country in 
a more unstable Somalia. Simply put, Turkey’s soft power appeal and 
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ability to start from scratch are made easier in a place like Somalia 
precisely because of the instability, violence, and history of stymied 
engagements by major international actors. In short, any Turkish suc-
cesses in Somalia would be outsized given the difficulty of an environ-
ment that suffers from byzantine clan politics, a terrorist insurgency, 
and an infrastructure that is dilapidated or destroyed. This played 
directly into Turkey’s main aim in engaging Somalia: to gain political 
and diplomatic capital outside Somalia.29 Somalia is the Turkish gov-
ernment’s answer to Turkey’s “place in the sun,” to use an archaic but 
prescient phrase.
Turkey’s humanitarian and development actions, its diplomatic 
presence, its flights in and out of Mogadishu via Turkish Airlines, 
and its willingness to host conferences about Somalia in Istanbul and 
Ankara have won Turkey prestige on the international stage.30 It has 
arguably made Turkey indispensable in Mogadishu to many Somalis.31 
It has also made Turkey an international player outside its own back-
yard. It is now an essential power and player when it comes to issues 
related to the Horn of Africa, an area traditionally outside Turkey’s 
sphere of influence.
A. The Question of History
Perhaps President Erdoğan and his government viewed Somalia nos-
talgically given its history. Indeed, Turkey, in the form of the Otto-
man Empire, was historically engaged at least peripherally in Somalia. 
This is a fact that has been repeated ad nauseam by Turks and non-
Turks alike as proof of an almost organic relationship between the two 
states.32 However, the Ottomans were only briefly allies of the Adal 
(Awdal) Sultanate, supplying weapons to assist in the Sultanate’s wars 
in Abyssinia, and in attempts to repel Portuguese invaders in the six-
teenth century. Interestingly, the Ottomans were mainly involved not 
in the area around Mogadishu, but in what is now the de-facto inde-
pendent state of Somaliland. The Adal Sultanate’s original capital was 
located in northern Somalia near what is now Djibouti, at Zeila, (Zayla) 
prior to moving inland to Harar, which is currently located in Ethiopia. 
Ottoman buildings still stand in Berbera, the main port city of Somalil-
and, as proof of their former influence. But brief historical exchanges 
of guns and political support and the remains of a few buildings can-
not possibly explain the motives underscoring Turkey’s current actions 
in Somalia.
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B. Anatolia’s Tigers
Clues to Turkey’s decision to become involved in Somalia may be 
found in the intrepid Turkish businesspeople who have a history of 
prospering in difficult areas. Turkey’s foray into Somalia was predi-
cated on Turkey’s accomplishment of something similar, first in Cen-
tral Asia in the 1990s, and then in Iraq vis-à-vis development and 
diplomacy and the broadcast of soft power after the American-led 
invasion.33 Turkey’s presence in the form of commerce, education, and 
industry are on display particularly in the majority Kurdish regions of 
Iraq.
The main players at the forefront of Turkey’s efforts in Iraq and 
in Somalia are Turkish businesspeople who are composed largely of 
the Anatolian bourgeoisie, the so-called Anatolian Tigers. The Anato-
lian Tigers were the main beneficiaries of the liberalization of Turkish 
market space that began in fits and starts in the 1980s and then picked 
up steam under successive AKP governments. The Anatolian Tigers 
capitalized on these gains. After all, they were largely responsible for 
catapulting Erdoğan to power more than a decade ago.34 In return for 
their continuing electoral support, Erdoğan and his government are on 
the lookout for new markets for goods produced by Turkey, primarily 
those of the Anatolian Tigers.35
Erdoğan’s government and its Turkish business partners likely 
understood that by gambling in volatile Mogadishu, they would auto-
matically be viewed as intrepid and visionary as well as humanitarian. 
No such praise or the accompanying diplomatic and political punch 
would come from investing in infrastructure in another state in the 
Middle East or the East Africa region. As a counterfactual example, 
if Turkey had invested in another impoverished state with a history 
of violence, such as South Sudan or Somaliland, it is safe to say that 
Turkey’s international prestige would not be as inflated nor would it 
produce the accompanying diplomatic clout. As important as is South 
Sudan’s oil, the logistics of working in such a place, coupled with less 
visibility, necessarily preclude major Turkish involvement. While Tur-
key did not involve itself in Somalia on account of a shared history or 
its common Sunni Muslim populations, Turkey’s presence fits more 
seamlessly in a place like Somalia than South Sudan. In the case of 
Somaliland, the visibility and outside recognition are severely lack-
ing. For example, Turkey’s control of the small airport in Hargeisa or 
the moribund port in Berbera, both in Somaliland, do not provide the 
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same international caché as control of the airport and port in Mog-
adishu. Turks would not be shepherding diplomatic personnel and 
humanitarian aid for major world powers if they were in Somaliland. 
Thus, the accolades from the U.S., the UN, and others that come from 
Turkey’s admittedly risky and important investment efforts in Moga-
dishu would not have been as readily forthcoming were the Turks in 
Hargeisa rather than Mogadishu.
V. Turkey as a Positive Force in Somalia?
Beyond divining the rationale behind Turkey’s calculated entry into 
Somalia, the truth is that Turkey’s actions in Somalia have been viewed 
as largely positive, inside and outside Somalia. UN officials publicly 
praise Turkey’s actions.36 They admire the ability of Turkish chari-
ties and government employees to work in areas of the Somali capi-
tal seen by Westerners as too dangerous. Turkish building sites have 
mushroomed in Mogadishu’s central Hodan district, which was at the 
epicenter of a protracted battle between Islamist rebels and African 
Union forces deployed to the coastal city to prop up the UN-backed 
government.37
A. Somalis and Turks: Natural Allies?
While Turkey’s involvement in Somalia has arguably produced certain 
positive results, Turkey must appreciate that it alone cannot solve the 
country’s many challenges. Turkey must secure the support and coop-
eration of Somalis in order for it to capitalize on the development of 
its government networks and business opportunities in Somalia. Thus 
far, Turkey has been rather more successful than others. Humanitarian 
efforts, the building of schools, and the willingness of Turks to take the 
risks associated with being in Mogadishu have all played a part. Visits 
by President Erdoğan have also proved incredibly popular.
When Erdoğan first visited in 2011, he brought along his wife, his 
children, ministers, businessmen, and artists. The visit to Mogadishu 
was the first by a non-African leader in two decades.38 Erdoğan’s visit 
with his family signifies how personal and important to Turkey their 
commitment to and investment in Somalia was regarded, especially 
given the lack of security guarantees on the ground in mid-2011. Fol-
low-up visits, direct flights from Istanbul to Mogadishu, and the build-
ing of hospitals and roads have all raised Turkey’s profile in Somalia. 
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Indeed, Turkey is understandably popular in Somalia in certain circles. 
An analysis of Turkey’s efforts over the past four years indicates that 
it has been successful in winning hearts and minds, at least in Moga-
dishu, where Turkish-built hospitals, roads, and schools are cherished 
signs of development, and names like “Erdoğan” for baby boys and 
“Istanbul” for baby girls are very popular.39 Funding for education and 
development is generous, timely, and welcome in Somalia. Turkey pre-
viously offered 1,200 scholarships, available to Somalis for university 
education in Turkey.40
B. Timing is Everything
It is impossible to understand Turkey’s successes in Somalia if one 
ignores two criteria: (a) when Turkey became involved in Somalia 
and (b) the incredible resilience, entrepreneurship, and innovation of 
Somalis. Turkey fortuitously decided to become involved in Somalia 
in late 2011. In this the Turks were blessed with very good timing 
even though the move was risky. By most estimates the threat of ter-
rorism had ebbed in large parts of Somalia, in particular in Mogadi-
shu. The al-Shabaab terrorist group had been forced to retreat from 
Mogadishu and would shortly lose its main source of revenue to 
Kenyan forces when they captured the key charcoal shipping port of 
Kismayo. The groundwork that the African Union Mission to Somalia 
(AMISOM) troops had laid since 2007, particularly that done by troops 
from Uganda and Burundi, spearheaded al-Shabaab’s slow but steady 
retreat from various regions in Somalia. Indeed, it can be argued that 
contributions by African countries like Burundi and Uganda, which 
have been fighting against al-Shabaab for years, have been overshad-
owed by Turkey’s charm offensive.
At the same time, a new famine crisis brought Somalia back into 
international headlines. In response, Erdoğan’s government did not 
simply offer to work with Somali businesses and have Turkish NGOs 
provide aid. He made a long-term commitment to Somalia backed 
with a robust diplomatic presence and the promise to provide aid for 
reconstruction then and in the future. Indeed, Turkey immediately 
pledged to re-open its embassy. This indicates either luck, political 
savvy, or both in that when Erdoğan rolled out his strategy in Somalia, 
he did so precisely when eyes were focused on the country on account 
of the famine. This further supports the evidence that Erdoğan and his 
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AKP cadre chose the right time to act and were intent on the potential 
international prestige from Turkey’s involvement in Somalia.
VI. An Intrepid Nation
Added to the issue of timing, a new Somali Federal Government (SFG), 
with more powers and definitely more prestige than the previous 
Somali Transitional Government (STG), was elected in 2012. With the 
election of the SFG, Turkey was blessed with willing partners who 
had a mandate to rule and distribute resources until well into 2016. In 
addition, intrepid Turkish businesses found willing partners in Soma-
lia. Though a bit cliché, trade and entrepreneurship are considered by 
many to be the lifeblood of the Somali people, and have flourished 
in many areas during the last two decades in spite of the instability, 
terrorism, and lack of infrastructure.41 Livestock, including camels and 
cattle, has remained the mainstay of Somalia’s economy and is cur-
rently flourishing on account of healthy demand from Egypt and the 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula. After decades of instability, Soma-
lia’s access to telecommunication infrastructure and the Internet is 
assisting other industries to thrive. The Somali telecom industry is esti-
mated to be one of the most competitive and dynamic in Africa. Finan-
cial services, such as those offered by Dahabshiil, a Somali-owned 
money transfer business, and their competitors, have also seen rapid 
expansion, and, like telecoms, are embracing the latest technology.
Given the relative peace and stability of 2011–2015, the entrepre-
neurship of Somalis, the access to cash inflows and technology, and 
a relatively stable government in Mogadishu, the timing of the Turks 
paid off. If Turkey had embarked on a foray into Somalia ten years 
earlier, it is safe to say that their ability to achieve success would have 
been severely curtailed. But Turkey also recognized the potential to do 
serious business in Somalia. As Abdirashid Duale, CEO of Dahabshiil, 
noted, “One of the things that most impresses me about the Turkish 
approach to the Somali territories is the recognition of the significance 
not just of our existing commercial successes, but of our economic 
potential, particularly in construction, real estate, mining and agricul-
ture.”42
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VII. How Turkish Money Provides Access and Prestige
Is Turkey’s success in Somalia simply about roads, hospitals, and 
schools? Is it all about timing, relative stability, and peace? Was Tur-
key, through its NGOs, religious organizations, and business acumen, 
simply able to step in and fill key gaps in education, health, and infra-
structure development? The answer to these questions is both yes and 
no.
Turkey is popular because of its visible and useful projects. Turk-
ish workers have built new hospitals and upgraded existing ones, 
improved access to safe drinking water, repaired damaged roads, and 
constructed the new international airport. But Turkey’s ability to build 
and act purposefully in an often unstable and clan-dominated Soma-
lia stems primarily from money. Direct cash payments from Turkey 
(reportedly delivered, at times, in suitcases to an internationally rec-
ognized but corrupt and relatively weak federal government in Mog-
adishu) automatically provide Turkey with an inordinate amount of 
influence in Somalia.43 Figure 1 demonstrates how the independent 
variable of Turkish money, often in the form of direct cash payments 
from the Erdoğan government, has provided the access to the vital 
Somali stakeholders in the SFG that Turkey required. The independent 
variable of Turkish money leads directly to the dependent variable of 
access, which then provides the dependent variable of influence over 
Somali powerbrokers, politicians, and clan leaders. Influence, in turn, 
has often led the dependent variable of control: direct Turkish control 
of resources, be that the airport, the port, and/or major infrastructure 
projects, such as roads and hospitals. In turn, the building or mainte-
nance or improvement of infrastructure (transportation, health, educa-
tion, commercial) leads directly to the prime motivating force behind 
Turkey’s foray into Somalia: international prestige and clout. Not sur-
prisingly, the independent variable of money, directly influencing all 
the listed dependent variables, resurfaces again and also happens to 
be the end product in this cycle. In short, Turkish money begets more 
money for Turkey while at the same time offering the possibility of 
access, influence, and control.
This influence has, among other things, allowed Turkey to sign a 
major military deal that allows it to train the Somali Armed Forces as 
well as construct sophisticated military camps.44 Additionally, it has 
resulted in Turkish companies being given lucrative and powerful con-
tracts to run the international airport and the port of Mogadishu. Most 
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importantly, it also gives the Erdoğan government a recognized place 
at the international negotiating table on Somalia and the region.45
Turkey is now viewed globally as a political and diplomatic power 
largely because of the risks it has taken in Mogadishu and its subse-
quent successes. Turkey’s additional efforts on the humanitarian and 
development fronts in the form of education, hospitals, schools, and 
related infrastructure have only added to the luster of its mission and 
the praise it receives from Somalis, international organizations, and 
states.
VIII. The Pitfalls of Turkey’s Presence in Somalia
Regardless of the large amounts of Turkish money circulating in the 
hands of Somali stakeholders, the Erdoğan government and Turkish 
businesses should not be viewed as philistines. Turkey, in this respect, 
is no different from the majority of other international stakeholders in 
Somalia. They arguably play the same money game, although not as 
effectively or with the same positive results as the Turks. Looked at in 
this way, Turkey is simply playing by the rules. Correspondingly, Tur-
key also faces the same pitfalls that bedevil all other actors in Somalia.
The fact remains that the Turks, unencumbered by other interna-
tional obligations or allies in Somalia, found willing partners in the 
SFG.46 President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, elected in 2012, was 
greeted as a break from previous, corrupt Somali transitional govern-
ment authorities. However, the best estimates show he has become 
almost as corrupt as his predecessors.47 The corruption in Mogadishu 
is so publicly rife that even Turkey declared a brief end to its policy 
of providing direct cash payments to the SFG in early 2014, though 
reports are conflicting.48 Soon after, it was announced that the pay-
ments would begin again.49 Turkey’s reasons for direct cash payments 
to the SFG are simple and straightforward. The current Turkish Prime 
Minister and previous Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, pointed to 
the lack of any viable banking infrastructure in Somalia, which neces-
sitated the provision of direct cash aid from the Turkish government 
to the Somali government. “No banking service is offered in Somalia,” 
Davutoğlu said, while emphasizing that the government of Turkey 
had provided monthly payments of $4.5 million to the federal govern-
ment of Somalia in the second half of 2013.50 By some estimates, Turk-
ish aid to Somalia by mid-2012, both in cash and in-kind, was well in 
excess of $350 million.51
Bildhaan  Vol. 16
112
A. Turkey and Reform in Somalia
Given the allegations, the levels of corruption, and the fact that most 
of the money destined for Somalia from the international communities 
falls into the hands of select stakeholders, calls for reform and changes 
to the way business is done in Somalia are legion.52 Yet for the time 
being, Turkey’s policy of direct cash payments to the SFG and other 
stakeholders is paying dividends. Why would Turkey change its tactics 
and apply pressure on the SFG to reform, as some have urged?53 The 
deck is stacked against such actions. Should Turkey choose to pres-
sure the SFG, it would likely be unsuccessful. This is because the large 
amounts of money flowing to the SFG come from multiple sources 
and via various methods, most of them opaque.54 For example, aid to 
Somalia from Saudi Arabia would continue to flow, as would largesse 
from the U.K., even though the foreign policy objectives of these two 
countries vis-à-vis Somalia are often at odds. Add to this the millions 
of dollars from all other regional and international actors currently 
operating in Somalia. The cash and “donations” never stop flowing.55 
Only its recipients change from time to time. “Despite all [the] glaring 
inefficiencies and failures [of aid agencies and international actors in 
Somalia], the aid industry continues unabated; in fact, it is going from 
strength to strength. Statistics indicate that the number of aid agencies 
and NGOs has mushroomed.”56 Yesterday it was dished out to TFG 
officials. Today it goes to SFG officials. Should Turkey choose to cut off 
funding to the SFG it would sting, but it would not spell the end of the 
SFG by any means. Turkey would only be punishing itself.
B. A Tarnished Image?
To be clear, Turkey’s ultimate goal of prestige and international clout 
are seemingly at odds with the methods it uses in Somalia, such as 
practices that engender corruption. However, the situation in Somalia 
leads much of the world to view it, “as nothing but trouble, a drain 
on resources and a source of Islamist terror.”57 Somalia is the most 
emblematic example of a failed state, according to countless reports. It 
has been without a functional government that can broadcast its power 
beyond Mogadishu for three decades. Past and current governments 
are “unable and/or unwilling to provide for the essential human needs 
of its citizens—in terms of security as well as adequate food, clean 
water, health care, and education.”58 In short, rules that ostensibly 
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govern international relations elsewhere are largely absent in Somalia. 
As noted, there is little to no oversight of funds going in and out of the 
country. Furthermore, actors from the international community, be 
they states, organizations, or businesses, often have competing agen-
das and therefore few of their efforts, including humanitarian efforts, 
are coordinated. It is precisely because of Somalia’s status for three 
decades as a failed state that “Turkish exceptionalism” has worked so 
well. In this case, Turkish exceptionalism, “adds to a rational choice of 
engaging in Somalia, because the payoffs over the long run are very 
lucrative: it enhances Turkish soft power while building its regional 
status as an emerging world power.”59 Turkey’s pragmatism in Soma-
lia leads it to simultaneously pursue self-interested goals (prestige) as 
well as furthering its business interests. The way to accomplish this is 
through money, which provides the access to Somalia’s rulers.
C. The Security of Turkey’s Investment and Long-Term Prospects in 
Somalia
Turkey’s position in Somalia is arguably unstable. Contracts and agree-
ments signed by the current SFG are not necessarily subject to scrutiny 
or parliamentary approval as required by the constitution. As such, oil 
and gas tenders as well as other contracts—including the Soma Oil and 
Gas deal—are riven with irregularities and may prove fleeting when 
a new government assumes power by the ballot box or otherwise.60 
The methods used by Turkey to its advantage to cut deals with the 
SFG may be the same methods used against them in the future. For 
example, Favori LLC, a Turkish company with ties to the Erdoğan 
government, gained control of the Mogadishu Airport under opaque 
circumstances, at the expense of a South African-staffed SKA Inter-
national Group.61 After the Favori contract was publicly leaked, the 
UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea accused Favori LLC of 
paying senior members of the SFG a $1.8 million “Initial Premium Fee” 
to remove SKA from the airport. Central Bank of Somalia records con-
firm that the $1.8 million was deposited on 24 January 2014.62 Though 
it controls the airport in Mogadishu for the time being and opened a 
new terminal, Turkey should understand that its hold on the airport is 
likely tenuous given past SFG behavior.63
The administration of President Hassan Sheikh also offered the 
Turkish firm Albayrak Group the contract to run Mogadishu’s sea-
port for twenty years, allegedly in exchange for payments of between 
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$6 and $8 million to the SFG.64 Though they have the contract to run 
the seaport, questions remain about the Turks’ ability of to manage it, 
given protests by port workers when the Albayrak Company took over 
operations in September 2014.65 But the port protests also demonstrate 
something else. Not all Somalis are overjoyed that the Turks are in 
Somalia. Turks and Turkish interests in Somalia have been attacked on 
numerous occasions.66 They remain a prime target of the al-Shabaab 
terrorist group.
IX. Coordination of Efforts: Unilateral versus Multilateral
Former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu presciently noted in 2012, 
soon after Turkey jumped feet first into Somalia, that, “While the entire 
world was looking to Somalia from the outside and holding confer-
ences in foreign capitals, Turkey has sent its most active civil society 
groups and aid organizations into Somalia, to be able to demonstrate 
that we share a common fate with Somalia.”67 This was a simplifica-
tion, of course. The “world” has been involved in Somalia since long 
before the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and the subsequent civil 
war and continued armed conflict.68 In fact, Turkey’s ability to act on 
the Somali stage is all the more impressive given the sheer number 
of actors already at play there and the spheres of influence they have 
carved out for themselves over the past two decades. These include 
but are not limited to nation-states (the U.S., the U.K., Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, etc.), the United Nations and entities 
tied to it, the African Union and AMISOM, hundreds of NGOs, the 
Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the Euro-
pean Union Mission to Somalia.
A recurring theme in relation to Turkey’s presence in Somalia is 
the need for coordination of its efforts with other international and 
regional actors. According to this logic, coordination and cooperation 
are the only means of ensuring Turkey’s overall and continued suc-
cess in Somalia.69 Based on the research, this analysis argues that the 
Erdoğan government’s success in Somalia is precisely because it has 
chosen to act in a unilateral and uncoordinated fashion.
It is precisely because the international community is at cross pur-
poses in Somalia that so much money is wasted on policies that coun-
teract one another. The multiplicity of actors lacking a coherent vision 
or the veneer of coordination has arguably done more damage to 
Somalia than anything else. “While Turkey’s interest in Somalia has 
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brought it into international spotlight, the interest that has been shown 
by the international community has been nothing more than ‘pseudo 
acts of kindness’ towards Somalia. To this day, the international com-
munity has been reluctant to solve any of Somalia’s long-standing 
problems.”70
It is a testament to the disjointed, competing, and ultimately inef-
fective nature of the work done by hundreds of stakeholders in Soma-
lia over the past quarter of a century that Turkey has found fertile 
ground for its development projects, business interests, educational 
endeavors, and military agreements. Indeed, though Turkey’s reasons 
for being in Somalia ultimately rest on burnishing its image by rais-
ing its international prestige and making money, Turkey’s activity is 
largely welcome precisely because it is effective in areas where so 
many others fail. It can be argued that the current unilateral nature 
of its engagement in Somalia is precisely the reason for Turkey’s rel-
ative gains vis-à-vis other stakeholders. It also rests on coordination 
of Turkish efforts. These involve not only the Turkish Foreign Minis-
try, the Turkish Health Ministry, the Religious Affairs Directorate, the 
Turkish Red Crescent, and other government entities, but NGOs such 
as Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İnsani Yardım Vakfı/İHH) and 
Kimse Yok Mu (literally, “Is anyone there?”). Smaller groups like Dost 
Eller (Friendly Hands), which offers civil society assistance, and the 
Turkish Businesspeople and Industrialists Confederation (TUSKON), 
which develops trade and investment between the two countries, also 
operate in Somalia. The efforts and actions of these stakeholders are 
coordinated from Ankara by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordina-
tion Agency (TİKA).71
X. Conclusion
Turkey’s foray into Somalia was primarily motivated by its desire for 
international recognition as an emerging power. Turkish money and 
aid donations delivered directly and unilaterally to key stakeholders 
in the SFG assisted the process. This provided Turkey with access 
to and influence with key patrons in the administration of President 
Hassan Sheikh. This, in turn, led to Turkish control over and man-
agement of major assets in Somalia, notably the airport and seaport. 
It has also provided Turkish businesses and the Turkish government 
with lucrative contracts. In the process, unilateral Turkish rebuilding 
efforts, offers of scholarships, renovations of hospitals, and the hosting 
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of international conferences on Somalia have resulted in the interna-
tional accolades and diplomatic clout craved by the Erdoğan govern-
ment. Turkey is now viewed as a peacemaker in Africa and, to some, as 
a savior to Somalia.72 Turkey is looked at by many as an honest broker 
in the Horn of Africa. Turkey and Turkish businesses are regarded 
favorably, at least by Somali stakeholders who engineered Turkey’s 
control of the airport and port. Furthermore, Turkey is close enough 
geographically to be considered a friendly power by Somalis, but far 
enough away to remain aloof in a way that the Arab states, Ethiopians, 
and Kenyans cannot.
Given the current climate of corruption, the competing goals of 
regional and international players, and the inability of the government 
to broadcast its power beyond portions of Mogadishu, it is politically 
and economically savvy for Turkey to act in a unilateral, highly coordi-
nated fashion and carve out its own sphere of influence in Somalia and 
Figure 1: Relationship between the main variables, including the 
independent variable of Turkish money delivered to Somali stakeholders 
that led to the genesis of numerous dependent variables: Turkish access, 
influence, control, and international prestige and clout. These independent 
variables, in turn, lead to more money and more power for Turkey.
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the wider region. By exploiting the status quo in Somalia, Turkey has 
helped itself as well as Somalia in some visible cases.
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